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THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION. By Hanoch Dagan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Pp. xxi, 374, $90. 
In his new book The Law and Ethics of Restitution, Hanoch 
Dagan1 undertakes to explain and justify the American law of 
restitution. He offers a broad theoretical account of this poorly 
understood subject, designed not only to fortify the substantive law of 
restitution but also to clarify the role and methodology of courts in 
developing the field. Dagan's book also provides lively discussion of 
the role of restitution in some of the most highly publicized legal 
developments of recent years. Those who think of restitution as an 
obscure branch of "legal remedies" may be surprised to read about the 
role restitution has played in tobacco litigation, slavery reparations, 
and rights following the breakup of unmarried cohabitants. 
Dagan describes himself as a Legal Realist in the style of Karl 
Llewellyn and Felix Cohen (pp. 3-4). Realism, for Dagan, entails "an 
ongoing (albeit properly cautious) process of identifying the human 
values underlying existing legal doctrines and trying to promote them 
in the best way possible."2 Accordingly, he subjects established rules 
across the field of restitution to a "normative" analysis based on the 
values of autonomy, utility, and community (p. 4). Working within this 
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1977, Lake Forest College; J.D. 1981, 
Boston University. - Ed. 
1. Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University Law School. The book expands and refines the 
analysis presented in Dagan's previous book on restitution, HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC VALUES (1997), and a number of 
articles on the subject. 
2. Dagan also refers at times to the interpretative approach of Ronald Dworkin. See pp. 
4, 9, 160. Dworkin's project, however, is very different from that of the American Legal 
Realists. Picking up on some of the suggestions put forth by Henry Hart and Albert Sachs, 
Dworkin envisions a method of decisionmaking according to "legal principles." Legal 
principles are legal in that they possess a dimension of "fit" with existing legal material, but 
also moral in that they interpret legal material in its "best" light. See RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW'S EMPIRE 240-50, 254-58 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-
31 (1978). The Legal Realists, in contrast, varied in many ways but believed in common that 
"law" and "legal" reasons do not constrain judicial reasoning. By implication, their 
understanding of what counts as law is narrower than Dworkin's. See Brian Leiter, American 
Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
50, (W. Edmundson & M. Golding eds., 2004). Moreover, Dworkin's dimension of "fit" is at 
odds with the Realists' core position. Arguably, Dworkin's scheme combines the artificiality 
that Realists dislike with the judicial power that positivists dislike. 
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framework, he sometimes defends existing rules, sometimes proposes 
refinements to rules, and sometimes argues for significant reforms. 
Dagan's book is a major contribution. He approaches restitution 
with a combination of doctrinal expertise and theoretical 
sophistication that is rare in writing on private law. His arguments are 
careful, consistent, and, most often, persuasive. Despite the overall 
success of the project, however, there are ambiguities in Dagan's 
jurisprudence. In particular, he maintains throughout the book an 
ambivalent attitude toward legal rules and their role in common law 
decisionmaking. Dagan is an avowed Realist, yet he is attentive to and 
respectful of doctrine and often presents his own recommendations in 
the form of rules. This raises the question: is it possible to be a rule­
oriented Realist? 
I. REALISM AND RESTITUTION 
A. Autonomy, Utility, and Community 
As noted, Dagan analyses the law of restitution in terms of three 
values that are prevalent in liberal societies: autonomy, utility, and 
community. Autonomy, for Dagan, means the power of self­
determination (not to be confused with negative liberty, which is only 
an instrument of autonomy) (p. 100). Utility means human welfare, 
typically elaborated through the proxy of economic analysis (p. 39). 
The value of community is somewhat more mysterious, although it 
plays an undeniable part in modem ethics. At times Dagan uses the 
term community to capture the ideals of cooperation, mutual support, 
and a limited form of altruism that accords value to the interests of 
others but does not require individuals to suppress all interests of their 
own (pp. 101-02). At other times, he uses the term to denote voluntary 
associations that contribute to the identity and welfare of individuals 
and can be facilitated by appropriate use of restitution (pp. 164-65). 
Dagan applies these values "contextually," that is, within the 
different classes of human situations in which restitution claims arise 
(pp. 8-9). He does not, however, recommend that judges simply 
balance the implications of autonomy, utility, and community in 
particular cases that come before them. Rather, he proposes that the 
rules of restitution should respond to the interplay of these three 
values in certain classes of cases. Later in this Review, I shall address 
the question what this means for judges. 
B. Unjust Enrichment 
The second chapter of Dagan's book, entitled Preventing Unjust 
Enrichment, does a major service to the law of restitution by 
demystifying the notion of unjust enrichment. In the 1937 
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Restatement of Restitution, Warren Seavey and Austin Scott 
assembled a variety of legal rules that appeared to exemplify a 
common principle, that no one should be unjustly enriched at 
another's expense.3 Since that time, the unjust enrichment principle 
has dominated both scholarly discussion of restitution and judicial 
analysis of gain-based legal claims.4 There are, however, significant 
differences of opinion about the role this principle plays or should play 
in judicial decisionmaking. Dagan, to his credit, prefers to minimize 
the role of unjust enrichment in legal reasoning and instead 
define restitution more simply as a field of law concerned with the 
recovery of gains. Unjust enrichment, in his view, is not "a legal 
argument" (p. 12). 
The principle forbidding unjust enrichment is susceptible to a 
variety of interpretations, with very different implications for how 
judges should resolve disputes. Most radically, it can be understood as 
a decisional principle authorizing judges to carry out "justice. "5 As an 
example of this approach, Dagan cites Lord Mansfield's famous 
conclusion in Moses v. Macferlan that the defendant was "obliged by 
3. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discussion Draft 2000). The unjust 
enrichment principle, which is traceable at least to Roman law, had already been identified 
with quasi-contract by James Barr Ames and William Keener. See WILLIAM A. KEENER, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 16 (1893); J.B. Ames, The History of 
Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53, 66, 69 (1888); J.B. Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 
1 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1887) (referring to "a comprehensive principle which lies at the 
foundation of constructive trusts and other equitable obligations . . .  namely, that a court of 
equity will compel the surrender of an advantage by a defendant whenever, but only 
whenever, upon grounds of obvious justice, it is unconscientious for him to retain it at 
another's expense"). For an excellent history of the law of restitution, see Andrew Kull, 
James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. (forthcoming 2005). On the Roman origins of unjust enrichment, see JOHN P. 
DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 42-63 (1951). 
4. For discussions of unjust enrichment in some of the leading treatises on restitution 
and remedies, see, for example, PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LA w OF 
RESTITUTION 16-22 (1985); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES§ 4.1(2), at 557-58 (2d ed. 
1993); LORD GOFF OF CH!EVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 12 (5th 
ed. 1998); and 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION§ 1.1, at 5 (1978). A new 
Restatement now under way is entitled the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, and nearly became the Restatement of Restitution. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (currently comprising Discussion 
Draft, 2000; Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001; Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002; Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2004) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; author's correspondence with Reporter 
Andrew Kull (on file with the author). 
5. Palmer's treatise states that "(u]njust enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same 
way that justice is indefinable. " 1 PALMER, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 5. For expansive 
interpretations, see, for example, GOFF & JONES, supra note 4, at 12, describing unjust 
enrichment as a "principle of justice which the law recognizes and gives effect to in a wide 
variety of claims," and Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, 
Contracts and Tons, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 695, 700-02, 773-75 (2001), which advocates an 
interpretation of unjust enrichment that permits courts to do "rough justice. " See also J. 
BEATSON, THE USE AND ABUSE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 1-2 (1991) (raising the possibility 
of enactment of the principle of unjust enrichment). 
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the ties of natural justice and equity" to repay money.6 Dagan argues 
cogently that, employed in this way, the unjust enrichment principle is 
incapable of constraining or even guiding judicial decisionmaking. It 
simply licenses "unprincipled adjudication," which Dagan rejects.7 
Dagan maintains that the values he invokes in his own analysis of 
restitution - autonomy, utility, and community - are "qualitatively 
different" from unjust enrichment. Dagan argues that, although vague, 
they have sufficient content to "serve as standards for principled 
adjudication" (p. 16). I have doubts about the capacity of these values, 
particularly the value of "community," to guide case-by-case 
adjudication in a useful way. Yet the line Dagan wishes to draw 
between Mansfield's version of unjust enrichment and the values he 
invokes seems unnecessary to me. Unjust enrichment, as applied by 
Mansfield, is a standard of decision: if it is "unjust" for the defendant 
to keep certain assets, then the judge should hold for the plaintiff. As I 
understand Dagan, he does not intend that autonomy, utility, and 
community should serve as "if, then" decisional standards for judges; 
rather, they are values judges and other lawmakers should consult in 
fashioning more determinate rules of decision. 
Another, somewhat narrower, understanding of unjust enrichment, 
which Dagan also rejects, instructs courts to reverse unjust 
enrichment-by-impoverishment, meaning enrichment that is linked to 
a corresponding loss suffered by the claimant.8 Dagan finds this 
version of unjust enrichment less dangerous as a decisional principle, 
but normatively unattractive because the linkage between the 
claimant's loss and the defendant's gain evokes the sentiment of envy 
(p. 16). The relative positions of claimant and defendant, rather than 
6. Pp. 14-15 (citing Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K.B. 1760) (Mansfield, 
J.)). I have distinguished two ways of interpreting unjust enrichment to support this form of 
decisionmaking. See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of 
Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2091-118 (2001). The principle of unjust 
enrichment might be read to define restitution as a special zone of equity within law, in 
which courts are free to disregard established rules in the interest of particularized justice. 
As Dagan recognizes, however, there is nothing about restitution, in comparison to other 
branches of private law, that makes "equity" in this sense specially appropriate. See p. 14; 
Sherwin, supra, at 2084. Alternatively, unjust enrichment can be read as a Dworkinian "legal 
principle" instructing judges to prevent enrichment that is "unjust. " As Dagan rightly argues, 
a principle of this sort is much too broad to guide decisionmaking: it has no determinate 
content apart from the court's own intuition about what result is best, all-things-considered. 
These two understandings of unjust enrichment lead to the same end point: "unbridled 
discretion" of the sort Dagan condemns. P. 16. 
7. See pp. 15-17; see also Stewart Macaulay, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 
1133, 1134-35 (1959) (proposing that courts deciding restitution cases should adjudicate in 
the manner of administrative agencies with "power to base decisions on unexplained 
expertise"). 
8. Pp. 17-18; Mark P. Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927, 
1953-55 (2001). 
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the fact of enrichment, become the basis of the claim. A conception of 
injustice that plays on resentment of comparative outcomes is out of 
place in Dagan's project of shaping and defending restitution as a 
positive force in law.9 
Next, Dagan considers and discards an interpretation drawn from 
civil law, which equates "unjust enrichment" with "unjustified 
enrichment."10 Unjustified enrichment is a transfer of wealth from one 
person to another that "lacks an adequate legal basis," or, more 
particularly, is not legally effective as a transfer of ownership.11 This 
interpretation appeals to my own sympathies in favor of rule-oriented 
decisionmaking, because it relies on background rules of law to give 
content to unjust enrichment. Yet, Dagan's criticism poses some 
significant problems for the concept of unjustified enrichment. Dagan 
argues that to make sense of unjustified enrichment, one must refer 
either to a particular conception of "property," to the entire body of 
legal rules external to restitution, or to the doctrinal rules that 
currently comprise the law of restitution. Property, in Dagan's view, is 
too contestable an idea to define what transfers should count as 
effective (pp. 21-22). A formulation that refers to rules outside 
restitution to define what counts as an adequate legal basis for 
enrichment implies that restitution itself has nothing to say about 
entitlements, an implication that is belied by the rules authorizing 
recovery of mistaken payments (pp. 19, 22). This leaves the doctrine of 
restitution itself. Dagan's objection to this version of unjustified 
enrichment is that it may inhibit judicial development and refinement 
of the law.12 
9. The connection to envy (or resentment) may be an inescapable ingredient of gain­
based claims, whatever their theoretical basis. See DAWSON, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that 
the idea of unjust enrichment was employed "by Karl Marx, who tapped an inexhaustible 
supply of resentment with the aid of his labor theory of value"); Christopher T. Wonnell, 
Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 175-90 (1996) 
(arguing that the principle of unjust enrichment is normatively unattractive and akin to 
envy). I have argued that while resentment and restitution are linked, this is not a reason to 
exclude restitution claims from law. A legal system probably will function more effectively if 
it provides outlets for common human sentiments that, while not virtuous, are not positively 
vicious. See Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 85 B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005). 
10. Pp. 18-25; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 1 cmt. (b) (Discussion Draft 
2000) (suggesting that unjust enrichment can be equated with unjustified enrichment); see 
also Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 
TuLANE L. REV. 605 (1962) (explaining the civil law standard of unjustified enrichment). 
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 1, cmt. b (Discussion Draft 1999). 
12. Pp. 22-23. Dagan refers to this as "the positivist trap. " P. 18. This seems an 
unwarranted indictment of positivism, which can easily accommodate development of new 
rules by judges, provided that judicial rulemaking is authorized by the applicable rule of 
recognition. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-93, 106-114 (1961) (explaining the 
rule of recognition). 
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Yet another understanding of unjust enrichment refuses to accord 
it any status as a decisional principle. Instead, unjust enrichment is a 
description of common features of restitution claims that may serve as 
an aid to analysis but does not authorize particular results.13 Dagan is 
sympathetic to this interpretation, provided that the features 
suggested by the term unjust enrichment are not taken too literally 
as a blueprint for evaluating cases.14 His own formulation treats 
unjust enrichment as a "loose framework," to be understood as a 
"placeholder for arranging and classifying legal rules that involve 
benefit-based liability" (p. 26). Accorded any greater authority than 
this, unjust enrichment will tend both to oversimplify a "complex 
and diverse" body of law and to result in decisions "by fiat, rather 
than by reason, obscuring the choices the law of restitution must 
make" (p. 25). 
Dagan's hard-headed treatment of unjust enrichment is refreshing 
and persuasive. Dagan does succumb to the temptation of unjust 
enrichment at one point when he suggests that the reference to justice 
can serve as an "invitation" to normative analysis (pp. 35-36). Yet he 
does not make the mistake of suggesting that restitution has properties 
that uniquely invite a Realist approach to law. For the most part, the 
role of unjust enrichment in Dagan's analysis is descriptive and 
organizational rather than authoritative. 
C. Topics in Restitution 
The ensuing chapters of Dagan's book apply the normative 
analysis he has outlined to well-known and emerging topics in 
restitution. He does not cover every problem that might take shape as 
a claim to restitution, but he does provide a comprehensive overview 
of important debates within the field. 
Dagan first takes up recovery of mistaken payments, a subject of 
interest in recent cases involving very large wire-transfer mistakes 
among banks. Here, Dagan focuses on the values of autonomy and 
utility: mistakes are involuntary transfers that threaten both the 
13. Pp. 26-33; BIRKS, supra note 4, at 18-25 (arguing that the principle of unjust 
enrichment should be understood as "downward-looking to cases"); Andrew Kull, 
Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96 (1995) (describing unjust 
enrichment as a unifying theme of restitution but not a standard of decisions for judges); 
Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 L. Q. REV. 29, 31-32 (1938) (describing 
unjust enrichment as a "postulate" underlying restitution but maintaining that the law of 
restitution must take the form of more specific rules); Sherwin. supra note 6, at 2108-12 
(discussing, favorably, an interpretation of unjust enrichment as "organizing idea" for 
decisionmaking). 
14. Pp. 27-28 (cautioning that Peter Birks's use of unjust enrichment as an analytical 
framework may "obscure the need for a contextual normative analysis"). 
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transferor's interest in free choice and the transferee's need for a 
stable basis for planning. They are also accidents that call for legal 
rules that will minimize their costs (pp. 38-39). This analysis leads 
Dagan to approve of the broad outline of current law, but also to 
suggest a number of context-sensitive refinements, such as a 
distinction between institutional transfers and individual transfers (pp. 
54-55). He also proposes significant reform in the area of taxes paid 
under statutes that are later held invalid. Contrary to the very limited 
recovery traditionally allowed, Dagan supports a rule of full 
restitution, based on the autonomy interests of the taxpayer and the 
government's superior ability to bear a loss (pp. 74-80). 
Many of Dagan's proposals for the law of mistakes take the form 
of rules. For example, he recommends a one-sided rule, which might 
be either no restitution or unlimited restitution, for mistaken transfers 
between institutions (in part to reduce administrative costs) and a rule 
of comparative fault for mistaken transfers between individuals (pp. 
51-52, 55-60, 73). Dagan's rules make contextual distinctions not 
explicit in the prevailing common law, but the grounds for decision he 
suggests are considerably more concrete than autonomy-in-context or 
utility-in-con text. 
Dagan next addresses the Good Samaritan problem: restitution 
claims based on the claimant's efforts to protect the life, health, or 
property of others. Dagan favors a significant expansion of 
restitutionary relief, based on a contractarian analysis of the 
transferee's autonomy and a version of the communitarian value of 
altruism that does not demand unmitigated self-sacrifice (pp. 99-103). 
In this context, Dagan appears to prefer comparatively indeterminate 
decisional standards over the more rule-like formulations of the 
common law. For example, he proposes a standard of "reasonable 
diligence" in place of the prevailing requirement of successful 
avoidance of harm to property, and a requirement that the claimant be 
"the most competent person [available] to act" in place of the 
prevailing limitation to professional rescuers (pp. 111, 114). At the 
same time, these proposals are not completely open-ended; they do 
not simply direct the court to balance autonomy and altruism. 
Dagan's next topic is restitution for gains the claimant conferred 
on the defendant for reasons of self-interest or self-protection. Here, 
Dagan's principal aim is to offer a rationale for traditional doctrine, 
which permits only certain recognized classes of claims, such as claims 
between co-owners of property, claims to contribution and indemnity 
between joint tortfeasors, and subrogation claims by insurers. Dagan's 
explanation for recovery in these situations is that when parties have 
interlocking interests restitution can help solve collective action 
problems, particularly problems of free-riding, which might otherwise 
deter mutually beneficial acts (pp. 131-36). On this basis, Dagan 
argues, restitution can advance both autonomy and utility, if sufficient 
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attention is paid to problems of subjective valuation (the defendant 
may not value the supposed benefit) and conflicts of interest (special 
interests of the claimant create problems of agency cost).15 In 
borderline cases, restitution may also be warranted because of its 
"third-party effects," such as facilitation of prompt payments by 
insurers to tort victims (pp. 152-55). This last consideration justifies, 
for Dagan, government claims against tobacco companies for 
restitution of expenses incurred in aid of smokers (pp. 155-63). 
In his discussion of self-interested benefits, Dagan argues quite 
explicitly that a rule-based system of liability is preferable to a system 
that employs indeterminate standards of liability. The free-rider 
problem is hidden in cases that reach the courts: if the prospect 
of free-riding had in fact deterred the claimant from acting, there 
would be no claim. Yet, the potential for deterrence of other actors 
remains unless there is a reliable prospect of restitution. In response 
to the view expressed by some commentators that legislatures 
are better suited to deal with problems of free-riding, Dagan 
suggests that courts can manage such problems if they employ 
determinate rules. Determinate rules will enable actors who might 
otherwise be frustrated to proceed in ways that produce collective 
benefits (pp. 138-39). 
The next chapter, "Restitution in Contexts of Informal Intimacy," 
takes up three doctrinal categories in which restitution claims have 
been controversial: claims between cohabitants, claims based on 
supplies of necessities (typically to the defendant's spouse), and 
rescission claims based on undue influence. Dagan argues that all 
three types of claims are justified by an interest in encouraging 
reciprocity and trust within "informal liberal communities" (p. 173). 
Restitution between cohabitants allows intimate parties to behave 
cooperatively without imposing an ethic of equal sharing that is more 
appropriate to marriage (pp. 173-80). Rules permitting restitution for 
necessities function as an indirect way to enforce equal control of 
marital property in states that do not recognize community property.16 
The doctrine of undue influence, as interpreted by Dagan, protects 
expectations of reciprocity within long-term, trust-based relationships 
by allowing parties who have shared such a relationship with a 
donor or testator to avoid transfers to newcomers (pp. 194-202). 
Some of Dagan's recommendations for promotion of informal 
15. Pp. 139-52 (discussing subjective devaluation and agency costs). 
16. Pp. 185-87. Necessities include supplies such as food, clothing, and medical care. 
P. 184. 
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communities are couched in vague terms, 17 but in most instances he 
relies on comparatively specific doctrinal devices to promote 
informal communities.1 8 
Dagan next discusses restitution remedies for wrongful 
appropriations. As Dagan rightly observes, the availability and 
measurement of restitution remedies for wrongful appropriations 
affect not only when appropriation is legally permitted, but also how 
much control an owner of resources can exercise over appropriations 
that are not permitted by law. For example, a remedy requiring 
disgorgement of all profits allocates full control to the owner, while a 
remedy measured by the fair market value of what was taken protects 
only the owner's level of well-being.19 Dagan employs this framework 
to evaluate possible remedial responses to a series of high-profile 
cases, including claims by descendants of slaves against corporate 
entities alleged to have wrongfully appropriated their ancestors' 
labor.20 As in other sections of the book, Dagan's solutions often 
involve the establishment of remedial rules for classes of situations.21 
The burden of Dagan's chapter on wrongful appropriation is to 
reconcile his approach with Ernest Weinrib's "correlativity thesis."22 
Weinrib argues that in a system of private law, a claimant's right to 
recover must correspond (in a justificatory sense) to the defendant's 
duty to pay.23 Dagan accepts this proposition, but rejects Weinrib's 
further argument that "the idea of property," rather than normative 
analysis, determines the extent of the claimant's right.24 In Dagan's 
view, property itself is a normative construct and defining the content 
17. For example, rescission for undue influence would be available to "people with 
whom the transferor had a trust-based, family-like relationship for a significant period of 
time." P. 195. 
18. See, e.g. , pp. 172-74 (requiring that cohabitant claims meet "a threshold of 
extraordinary benefits"); pp. 188-89 (discussing alternative forms of liability for necessities 
furnished to a spouse). 
19. Pp. 213-17; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamud, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) 
. (discussing the consequences of different means of protecting entitlements). 
20. Pp. 249-56. Other topics are joint infringement of patents, publication in violation of 
fiduciary duty, and appropriation of cell lines. In my view, Dagan's analysis is generally 
persuasive, although sometimes muddied by an unfortunate neo-Hegelian conception of 
property rights. P. 222. 
21. Pp. 238-39 (approving the use of "ancillary" requirements to enforce fiduciary duties 
of loyalty). 
22. P. 218 (describing Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. l, 3-5 (1999)). 
23. Pp. 217-19 ("Thus, 'the reasons that justify the protection of the plaintiffs right 
[must be] the same as the reasons that justify the existence of the defendant's duty,"' such 
that "the plaintiff must be 'entitled to receive the very sum that the defendant is obligated to 
pay.'") (quoting Weinrib, supra note 22, at 3-5). 
24. Pp. 219-220 (quoting Weinrib, supra note 22, at 6-7, 12, 24). 
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of entitlements necessarily involves choosing among competing values. 
A normative analysis of entitlements that takes into account 
deterrence and efficiency as they pertain to the resource-holder's 
control and well-being is consistent with the requirements of the 
correlativity thesis. 
Dagan's next topic is restitution in contractual settings. Here, 
Dagan outlines two competing views of the normative goals of 
contract law: economic efficiency and a cooperative sharing of 
burdens and benefits. These two views lead to different resolutions of 
the classic question whether restitution of profits should be generally 
available as a remedy for breach of contract. The economic approach 
(to which Dagan seems partial in this context) leads Dagan to the 
conclusion that restitution should not be allowed, due to the difficulty 
of proving profits in ordinary contract cases. A sharing approach, on 
the other hand, leads to the conclusion that gains from breach should 
be allocated between the parties. In his analysis of this and other 
contractual problems,25 Dagan typically ends by proposing a 
reasonably determinate default rule which the parties can alter 
contractually if they wish.26 
Dagan's last topic is the role of restitution in bankruptcy. 
Recognition of constructive trust claims based on state restitution law 
in bankruptcy has become controversial because of the automatic 
priority this remedy accords to certain classes of claims. Dagan is 
uncomfortable with both the prevailing approach, which relies without 
further analysis on non-bankruptcy criteria for awarding a 
constructive trust remedy, and the alternative view that constructive 
trusts are a legal fiction that should not affect ratable distribution of 
assets in bankruptcy. Dagan points out that all entitlements are, in 
effect, legal artifacts; therefore the "fiction" argument against 
constructive trusts is irrelevant. On the other hand, he finds merit in 
only one argument offered in favor of constructive trust priority: that 
constructive trust claimants are, to varying extents, involuntary 
creditors.27 The difficulty with this argument is that it justifies not only 
25. Other subjects covered are losing contracts and restitution claims by subcontractors. 
Pp. 282-96. 
26. Seep. 281 (suggesting that a fixed rule for gain-splitting is preferable to case-by-case 
evaluation of the parties' desert). 
27. One defense of constructive trusts that Dagan rejects is my own, offered fifteen 
years ago. Emily Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 297 
(1989). Reconsidering the subject, I would not now rely, as I did then, on the term "unjust 
enrichment" in support of priority. The term served as shorthand for the thought that 
constructive trust claimants have contributed assets to the pool available to creditors, so that 
creditors will not be made worse off if the claim is allowed. Dagan may be correct that 
contribution has no normative significance. P. 320. As of the time of the bankruptcy petition, 
any unpaid claim has a causal effect on the sum of available assets. It is possible that 
contribution has psychological significance that should be recognized by law. Apart from 
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priority for constructive trust claimants, but priority for all tort 
claimants. Dagan is inclined to support this priority, but recognizes 
that a move of this kind would require a radical reshaping of overall 
bankruptcy policy (pp. 324-27). 
II. REALISM, RESTITUTION, AND RULES 
As noted, Dagan explicitly aligns himself with "mainstream" 
American Legal Realism (pp. 3-4). As described by Brian Leiter, the 
"core claim" of American Legal Realism is that legal rules do not 
constrain judicial decisionmaking: "judges respond primarily to the 
stimulus of the facts of the case, rather than to legal rules and 
reasons."28 Judicial response to facts may be predictable, and it 
presumably is based on justifying reasons.29 But the reasons that drive 
and justify judicial decisions are not legal reasons. Rather, they derive 
from a normative analysis of the type Dagan applies to the law of 
restitution: "(b]y emphasizing the indeterminacy of law and legal 
reasoning, and the importance of non-legal considerations in judicial 
decisions, the Realists cleared the way for judges and lawyers to talk 
openly about the political and economic considerations that in fact 
affect many decisions. "30 
Dagan is by no means hostile to rules of law; most of his arguments 
either provide a normative defense of existing rules or propose new 
rules that are more sensitive to considerations of autonomy, efficiency, 
and community. Only occasionally does he recommend that judges 
eschew rules and decide what is best case-by-case. His endorsement of 
rules, however, does not necessarily remove him from the Realist 
this, however, I find Dagan's analysis persuasive, although I might diverge from his 
conclusion that all involuntary creditors should have priority. 
28. Leiter, supra note 2, at 6-7; see also BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND 
CONTEXT 178-84 (3d Ed. 2003) (associating American Legal Realism with belief in the 
indeterminacy of legal rules, formalism, hostility to abstract legal concepts, and the view that 
decisions are "underdetermined by legal rules"). 
Leiter describes Realism as "a naturalized jurisprudence," marked by "normative 
quietism." That is, most Realists assume that neither Jaw nor jurisprudence can influence 
judges, therefore it is pointless to prescribe the methods by which judges should reach 
decisions. Jurisprudence can only hope to describe rather than justify the pattern of 
decisions. See Leiter, supra note 2, at 14-15, 18. Of course, this does not mean that judges 
themselves eschew normative analysis. 
29. Leiter writes: 
The thesis of the Sociological Wing Realists like Llewellyn, Oliphant and Moore - that 
judges enforce the norms of commercial culture or try to do what is socio-economically best 
on the facts of the case - should not be confused with the idea that judges decide based, for 
example, on how they feel about the particular parties or the lawyers. 
Leiter, supra note 2, at 12; id. at 17 ("the crux of the Realist position (at least for the 
majority of Realists) is that non-legal reasons (e.g., judgments of fairness, or considerations 
of commercial norms) explain the decisions"). 
30. Id. at 21-22. 
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camp. Not all Realists were opposed in principle to legal rules; for 
some, at least, the objection was only to abstract and artificial rules 
that bore no relation to real disputes.31 Llewellyn, after all, was the 
principal draftsman of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Like Dagan, he and others worked to design rules that reflected a 
reasoned normative response to facts.32 Accordingly, it would seem 
that Dagan can be a Realist and still proceed, as he does, to 
recommend rules for most classes of restitution cases. A rule-oriented 
Realist like Dagan, however, must answer some difficult questions 
about how these rules should function in legal reasoning. 
To explain this point, some groundwork is needed on the subject of 
rules. Rules are designed to translate the implications of normative 
values into concrete prescriptions for action or decision.33 To function 
effectively, rules must be general, in the sense that they prescribe 
outcomes for classes of cases.34 They must also be sufficiently 
determinate that rule-appliers can understand what the rules prescribe 
without first resolving the very normative questions the rules are 
designed to settle.35 
From the point of view of a governing authority seeking to 
advance shared values such as autonomy, utility, and community, a 
rule has significant advantages over unconstrained decisionmaking, 
provided that it is regularly applied. If the rule-maker possesses 
information not easily accessible to rule-appliers, or if rule-appliers 
are prone to systematic biases (for example, a tendency to overvalue 
salient facts in comparison to background probabilities), regular 
application of the rule can reduce error.36 Rules also allow individuals 
31. See Leiter, supra note 2, at 8, 11, 14 (referring to "Realists who envisioned a 
refashioned regime of legal rules that really would describe and predict judicial decisions, 
precisely because they would take account of the particular factual contexts to which courts 
are actually sensitive"). 
32. See, e.g., .KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS 
STUDY 159 (1960) ("Every opinion must be directed forward, it must make sense and give 
guidance for tomorrow for the type of situation in hand") (emphasis in original); Leiter, 
supra note 2, at 8-9 (discussing Llewellyn and Herman Oliphant). 
33. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 1-12, 23-27, 54 
(1991) (defining rules and describing them as "instantiations" of background values). 
34. See id. at 77-78 (distinguishing decisionmaking according to general rules and 
particularistic decisionmaking). 
35. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 1-17, 30 (2001) (discussing settlement and 
determinacy); SCHAUER, supra note 33, at 53-62 (defending the possibility of determinate 
rules); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 520-32 (1988) (defending the 
capacity of rules to constrain decisionmaking). 
36. On the expertise function of rules, see, for example, TOM CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL 
THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 51, 58 (1996), and SCHAUER, supra note 33, at 150-52, 
158-59. 
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to coordinate their actions with the actions of others, if they can 
predict with reasonable certainty that others will follow the rules. 
Coordination, in tum, advances welfare by resolving prisoners' 
dilemmas and other problems of collective action.37 Finally, rules can 
minimize the time and effort spent in deciding what to do.38 These 
benefits, and particularly the benefits that arise from coordination, 
depend on a reasonably high level of compliance with the terms of 
the rule. 
Of course, regular application of rules also produces error. 
Because rules are general, they run the risk of over- and under­
inclusiveness when applied to particular cases.39 Most rules, in other 
words, will sometimes prescribe the wrong result. Nevertheless, the 
use of rules is justified whenever the rule in question, applied to all 
cases that fall within its terms, will result in fewer normative errors 
than all-things-considered reasoning.40 
When a rule is justified in this sense, a governing authority will 
prefer that the actors or decisionmakers who apply the rule follow it in 
all cases, without considering whether the local outcome of the rule 
conforms to the values the rule is supposed to advance.41 The reason 
for this preference is that individual decisionmakers may err in 
attempting to judge what these values require. They may lack 
information, be subject to bias, or fail to appreciate the need for 
coordination. These defects of reasoning were, after all, precisely what 
led the authority to enact a rule. Therefore, if regular compliance with 
the rule "banks should not be permitted to claim restitution for 
mistaken payments to other banks" will yield better results in the run 
of cases Uudged by background standards such as autonomy and 
utility), the governing authority will prefer that all judges always 
follow the rule, even when it appears to reduce autonomy or utility in 
a particular case. 
37. On the coordination function of rules, see, for example, JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 49-50 (1986), SCHAUER, supra note 33, at 163-66, Heidi M. Hurd, 
Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203, 2293-301 (1992), Mark C. Murphy, 
Surrender of Judgment and the Consent Theory of Political Authority, 16 LAW & PHIL. 115, 
125-27 (1997), and Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of 
Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982). 
38. A rule gives actors no reason to assume that others will act according to the rule, 
and no coordination-based reason to conform to the rule unless the rule is generally obeyed. 
For further explanation of this point, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 35, at 65-66. 
39. See SCHAUER, supra note 33, at 31-34, 47-52 (discussing the underinclusiveness and 
overinclusiveness of rules). 
40. See RAZ, supra note 37, at 70-80 (discussing the "normal justification" of rules). 
41. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 35, at 54 (explaining the rationality of 
"serious" rules from the point of view of a rulemaking authority); SCHAUER, supra note 33, 
at 131-33 (arguing that a governing authority may be justified in discouraging individual 
judgment); Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 5, 9-11 
(explaining why an authority has reasons to require individuals to follow rules). 
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This attitude, however, seems contrary to the premises of Legal 
Realism: how can we expect a judge to comply with a rule he or she 
thinks will lead to the wrong result? Perhaps Dagan would say that 
Realism, and the normative analysis it makes possible, should be 
practiced only by those who design the rules and not by those who are 
charged with applying them. Once sound rules are in place, judges 
should follow them. Realism, however, is a theory about judicial 
decisionmaking, which rests in part on skepticism about the capacity 
of rules to constrain judges.42 Moreover, Dagan's theory of restitution 
is a theory of the common law, envisioning a continuing process of 
legal development that rests in the hands of judges.43 It is highly 
unlikely, therefore, that he would wish to bind judges to apply existing 
rules without further reflection on the fairness of the rules' outcomes. 
A more likely interpretation of rule-oriented Realism is that 
judges should (and do) approach rules with the attitude Frederick 
Schauer describes as rule-sensitive particularism.44 A rule-sensitive 
particularist decides what outcome is best according to all available 
reasons. In a case governed by the terms of a rule, these reasons 
include both substantive values (autonomy, utility, and community, for 
example), and the value of preserving the integrity of the rule. That is, 
the rule-sensitive particularist bears in mind the effect that a departure 
from the rule may have on the rule's capacity to reduce error and 
facilitate coordination in future cases.45 Rule-sensitive particularism 
does not treat rules as constraints on judicial reasoning; rather, it calls 
on judges to give appropriate weight to the value of rules in the 
process of unconstrained moral reasoning. 
This seems a plausible description of the approach Dagan takes to 
rules. He enlists rules as means for advancing normative values and 
shows considerable appreciation for the benefits of rule form, but he is 
also willing to depart from existing rules as those values require. 
Consider, for example, Dagan's conclusion in chapter five that 
restitution should be available for substantial transfers between 
42. See Brx, supra note 28, at 178 (noting the Realist focus on adjudication); supra notes 
28-32 and accompanying text (discussing Realist skepticism about rules). Leiter distinguishes 
between Conceptual Rule-Skepticism and Empirical Rule-Skepticism, meaning skepticism 
about whether judges will in fact comply with rules. See Leiter, supra note 2, at 25-33. I am 
talking here about the more reasonable position of Empirical Rule-Skepticism. 
43. Seep. 6 (referring to the "ongoing ... process" of normative development of law). 
44. See SCHAUER, supra note 33, at 94-100. 
45. Schauer puts it this way: 
Given that result a is indicated by rule R, you (the rule subject) shall reach result a unless 
there are reasons for not following rule R in this case that outweigh the sum of the reasons 
underlying R and the reasons for setting forth those underlying reasons in the form of a rule. 
Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 645, 676 n.66 
(1991). 
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cohabitants who later split. Dagan employs a relatively concrete 
requirement of "significant asymmetric contribution" to define 
cohabitant claims in a way that will promote "liberal community" but 
stop short of imposing an egalitarian ideal on cohabitants who have 
chosen not to marry (pp. 168, 173-80). Yet, his endorsement of 
restitution in this context requires him to disregard several limits on 
restitution that he probably would endorse in other circumstances. 
Established rules, applicable across the field of restitution, hold that 
neither a consensual transfer (such as a gift) nor an officious transfer 
(one in which the transferor has bypassed reasonable opportunities to 
negotiate for payment) will support a claim.46 In the context of 
cohabitation, transfers from one cohabitant to the other are often 
understood at the time as gifts. If the transferor does not intend a gift, 
but instead expects reimbursement, the transfer arguably is officious.47 
Thus, to support cohabitant claims, Dagan must make exceptions to 
the established limits on restitution. The exceptions he makes can be 
explained as an exercise in rule-sensitive particularism: encouraging 
communitarian behavior by cohabitants is sufficiently important (in 
Dagan's view) to overcome not only the reasons of autonomy and 
utility underlying traditional limits on restitution, but also the harm 
that an exception for cohabitants may do to the reasons for casting 
these limits as rules. 
Larry Alexander and I have argued elsewhere that, despite its 
initial appeal, a strategy of rule-sensitive particularism is not likely to 
succeed in preserving the value of rules.48 Put briefly, if a rule is 
justified by the rulemaker's superior information, expertise, or 
impartiality, a rule-sensitive particularist who understands that rules 
are typically overbroad and believes the rule to be overbroad in his or 
her case will not accord the rule much epistemic weight. In the more 
common case in which the rule is justified as a solution to coordination 
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 1, cmt. b, at 3 (gifts, contractual 
exchange) (Discussion Draft 1999); id., § 2(2) (consensual transfer); id., § 2(4) 
(circumstances do not excuse negotiation for contractual exchange). 
47. The draft Restatement, which also endorses this type of claim, recognizes that 
recovery in these circumstances requires an exception to the normal limits on restitution. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 28, cmt. c, at 27 (Council Draft No. 4 2002). Dagan 
and others suggest that negotiation is inherently out of place in the context of cohabitation. 
Seep. 170; Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 
28 UCLA. L. REv. 1125, 1163 (1981) (citing unequal bargaining power and the difficulty of 
exit); Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract 
and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49, 56-58 (1978) (suggesting that contract is not a 
realistic alternative for cohabitants); Ira Mark Ellman, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy 
of Marvin v. Marvin· "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1365, 1367-78 (2001) (arguing that contracts are uncommon and undesirable among 
cohabitants). But see Emily Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and Heartbreak Cases (unpublished 
manuscript) (suggesting that in the settings in which restitution claims are most likely to 
arise, a requirement of negotiation is not overly burdensome). 
48. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 35, at 61-68. 
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problems, a rule-sensitive particularist will recognize that deviating 
from the rule could impair public perception of the rule as a reliable 
predictor of decisions and conduct. For several reasons, however, the 
rule-sensitive particularist is likely to discount this potential harm. 
First, the potential harm that any one deviation from the rule will 
cause to rule values such as coordination and error reduction is likely 
to appear small, particularly to a decisionmaker distracted by the facts 
of the case.49 Second, in a community of rule-sensitive particularists, 
each rule-applier will know that other rule-appliers are also rule­
sensitive particularists. Therefore each rule-applier will expect other 
rule-appliers to assess all underlying reasons for a decision (including 
rule values). Given the limits on human reasoning and the distracting 
effects of salient and appealing facts, each rule-applier will expect 
some rule-appliers to decide erroneously to deviate from the rule. 
Each rule-sensitive rule-applier also will anticipate that other rule­
appliers will make the same calculation - that is, each will conclude 
that fellow rule-sensitive rule-appliers may err. The expectation that 
others will err reduces the coordination value of the rule, which in turn 
reduces the harm done by any single deviation. At some point in the 
iteration of this reasoning, there is no longer any reason to expect 
general conformity to the rule and no reason for a rule sensitive rule­
applier to accord any weight in his or her decision to the coordination 
value of the rule. 
Again, cohabitant cases provide an illustration. Whether the 
communitarian benefits of restitution between cohabitants overcome 
the reasons that support limits on recovery for consensual or officious 
transfers (including the reasons for maintaining those limits as rules) is 
a difficult calculation to make. From the point of view of a judge 
confronting a dispute between ex-cohabitants, the impact of a single 
exception to the normal limits on restitution may appear minor. 
Meanwhile, the human appeal of a deserted cohabitant's claim may 
dwarf disembodied concerns such as damage to the integrity of 
donative transfers. Thus it is easy - possibly too easy - to conclude 
that the balance of reasons favors relief. If over the run of cases this 
conclusion is mistaken, the traditional limits on restitution may no 
longer be credible and whatever protection they furnish to values of 
autonomy and utility may be lost. 
In a functioning legal system, it seems unlikely that all decision­
makers will be rule-sensitive particularists. Simplicity, habit, and 
possibly indoctrination will lead at least some actors and judges to 
49. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
163 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining the tendency of reasoners to overvalue 
salient facts in comparison to background regularities). 
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follow rules without question, at least some of the time. As a result, 
rules may retain their value despite scattered instances of rule­
sensitive particularism, and, accordingly, rule-sensitive particularists 
will often have reason to follow rules. Yet if rule-sensitive 
particularism becomes widespread and visible, it may endanger 
the value of rules. This presents a dilemma for a rule-oriented Realist 
such as Dagan: rules can serve as effective means for carrying 
out normatively attractive programs only if the truth of Legal Real­
ism, and the scope of rule-sensitive particularism, are kept from 
general view. 
CONCLUSION 
Dagan has written an excellent book on a difficult subject. His 
analysis of restitution is careful, readable, extremely well-informed,50 
and normatively attractive. It succeeds very well in presenting 
restitution as an accessible and appealing field of law. 
I have expressed some doubts about the viability of Dagan's 
approach to legal rules, which I have described as rule-oriented Legal 
Realism. Given Dagan's unusually modest, open-minded, and 
temperate scholarly disposition, rule-oriented Legal Realism as he 
practices it may produce admirable results. Yet the approach carries 
with it dangers and difficulties that might cause problems in other, less 
skillful hands. 
50. The bibliography lists over 230 books. I am persuaded that Dagan has read these 
books. 
